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Abstract: This comment corrects some errors of analysis contained In a 1993 paper by
Carey In the Journal of Industrial Economics.
In a 1993 paper in the Journalof Industrial Economics, Carey studies the
problem of reservation price announcement in sealed bid procurement auctions.
Assuming that the auctioneer/monopsonist has a self-supply option and is motivated
by the desire to minimize the expected total cost of procurement, she investigates the
auctioneer's decision to announce a reservation price and the level at which it should
be set. Carey's analysis includes some errors, however. This comment proposes
corrections. I begin by describing the auction setting.
The auctioneer seeks to purchase a single unit of a good or service from one
of Nbidders. Bidders' supply costs; denoted c^, C2. . . ., c^; are independently,
identically distributed U[0,1] random variables. In addition, the seller has the option
of self-supply at a cost of Cq which is also drawn from the U[0,1] distribution
independently of the other CjS. The model incorporates the "private value"
assumption in that each player, whether a bidder or the auctioneer, is assumed to
know the actual value of his or her own supply cost, but only the joint distribution from
which the other players' costs are drawn. Bidders enter sealed bids with the
objective ofmaximizing expected profit given the understanding that the contract will
be awarded to the low bidder at a price equal to the low bid provided that it is no
greater than a (possibly unannounced) reservation price.
For each auction mechanism considered, the solution is a symmetric, Nash
equilibrium bid strategy, b*, that can be thought of as a mapping of the range of
possible supply costs into bids: b*: [0.1] M. The method for deriving b* is the
customary one used to solve for Nash equilibria: Consider a representative bidder,
the i^^, who selects a bid, bj, to maximize expected profit, tt:, assuming that all other
bidders play strategy b*. By requiring that optimal play for bidder i likewise be
consistent with b*; that is, by requiring that bj = b*(Cj): the first order condition for
expected profit maximization becomes a differential equation in b*(-) which, when
solved subject to a boundary condition dictated by the nature of the auction
mechanism, yields a unique solution.
Expected profit for the i**^ bidder is given by Carey's equation (1):
,7ri(bj, Cj) = (bj - Cj) G(bj), (1)
where G(bj) is the probability that bidder iwill win with a bid of bj assuming other
bidders play b*. Differentiating with respect to bj and setting the result to zero yields
Carey's equation (2):
bj = Cj - G(bi) / G'(bj). (2)
In the first auction mechanism considered, the "no-reservation-price" auction,
the auctioneer renounces the self-supply option and commits to purchase from the
lowest iDidderJ For this case
G(bi) = Prob{ bj < b*(cp for j = 1, 2, . . .. N, j i}
=Prob{ b*-\b|) < Cj forj =1, 2 N, j i} (3)
= [1 - b-\bi)]N-''
where the second equality uses the assumption that b*(-) is strictly increasing on
[0,1] and the third reflects the particular assumed form of the distribution of the CjS.^
Substituting into (2). imposing bj = b*(Cj), and dropping the "i" subscript yields
b"(c) - -^b'(c) =^ (N - 1). (4)
3Carey's solution obtains by solving this equation subject to the boundary condition
b*(1) = 1:^
b*(c) = c + (1 - c)/N. (5)
In the second auction considered, the "unannounced-reservation-price" or
"secret-reservation-price" auction, the auctioneer solicits bids with the understanding
that the contract will be awarded to the low bidder unless the low bid is greater than
the auctioneer's own supply cost. If it is, the low bid will be rejected and the
auctioneer will self-supply. In this case, G(bj) is given by
G(bj) = Prob{ bi < b*(Cj) forj = 1, 2 N, j i; and b| £ Cq }
=[1 - b*-i(bi)]N-\l - bi). (6)
This specification reflects the fact that obtaining the contract requires that the i*^
bidder beat all rival bidders' bids and beat the auctioneer's "bid" ofCq. Substituting
into (2), imposing bj" = b*(Cj), and dropping the "i" subscript yields
b•'(c) = (N - 1)(1 - b'(c))(b-(c) - c) (7)
(1 - c)(1 - 2b "(c) + c)
For this auction mechanism, the boundary condition b*(1) = 1 is clearly appropriate.
No bidderwould bid less than own cost under any circumstances, so b*(1) ^ 1. But
because the auctioneer's self-supply cost Is confined to [0,1], bids greater than 1 can
be excluded as having no chance of winning. As can be verified, by direct
substitution, the solution to (7) subject to b*(1) = 1 is
b*(c) = c + (1 -c)/(N + 1). (8)
Carey also reaches this conclusion, but apparently by accident. Her analysis
mistakenly treats the auctioneer as an N+ 1®* symmetric bidder, so her equilibrium
4bid strategy is tlie solution to equation (4) subject to b*(1) = 1, but with N + 1
replacing N. However the unannounced-reservation-price auction with N bidders is
not equivalent to the no-reservation-price auction with N+ 1 bidders for an important
reason that was foreshadowed by the expression for G(-) in equation (6): To,win the
unannounced-reservation-price auction,, a representative bidder must beat N - 1
bidders playing b* plus an additional "bidder," the auctioneer, who "bids" not b*(Co),
but Cg itself. That the two distinct games have identical equilibrium strategies
appears to be merely an artifact of the particular distribution Carey uses. In any
case, Carey's subsequent analysis of expected buyer costs in the unannounced-
reservation-price case is correct as are the figures in the top half of her Table I.
In the third auction mechanism considered, the "announced-reservation-price"
auction, the auctioneer announces a maximal acceptable bid, b, prior to bidding. The
contract is awarded to the low bidder if the low bid is less than or equal to b. If no
qualifying bid is submitted, the auctioneer engages in self-supply. Typically, not all
bidders will submit qualifying bids in this case and, from the perspective of the
representative bidder, the number who will is a random variable. Carey's analysis
assumes that the representative bidder will behave as if facing a non-random number
of bidders equal to the expected value of the actual distribution. But there is no need
to resort to this sort ofad hoc assumption about behavior. The equilibrium bid
strategy will be strictly increasing on [O.b] and bidders with supply costs greater than
bwill decline to bid. Declining to bid can be thought of as submitting any bid greater
than b. So in order to win, the i^^ bidder facing N- 1competitors who play strategy
b* must submit a bid no bigger than b*(Cj) for j =1. 2, . . .. N, j i. This means that
G(bj) is exactly as given in (3). The only feature that distinguishes the analysis of
this case from that of the no-reservation-price case is the boundary condition. Since
bidders will never bid less than cost and only bids less than or equal to b can win,
b*(b) = b is the appropriate boundary condition to use in solving (4). The result is
b-(c) =
C. ^(1 - C)
N
1-
1 - b
1 - c
for c ^ b
(9)
no bid for c > b
That Carey's proposed solution, her equation (8), fails to satisfy (4) can be confirmed
by direct substitution.
Calculation of the expected buyer cost and the optimal reservation price for the
announced-reservation-price model is easier within the context of a clever dual
approach due to Riley and Samuelson. The following presentation simply adapts
their analysis to the case of a monopsonist's auction rather than a monopolist's
auction.
To simplify notation and to slightly generalize the analysis, use F(-) and f(-) to
denote, respectively, the cumulative distribution and density functions ofthe
distribution ofsupply costs on [0,1]. As before, consider the problem from the
perspective of the i*^ bidder facing N- 1rivals who play b*. Assuming that b*(-) is
strictly increasing, the choice of a bid, bj, is equivalent to the choice of Xj = b*"''(bj).
Establishing that b* is the optimal strategy for the i^^ bidder amounts, in this case, to
showing that the optimal choice of Xj is Cj.
6Let P(Xj) denote the expected payment to bidder igiven that he "bids" Xj and
let n{Xj. Cj) denote the expected profit for bidder i given that he "bids" x= and has cost
C|. Then
Il(Xj.Cj) = P(Xj) - Cj Prob{ iwins the auction }
=P(Xi)-Ci[1- F(Xi)ri, -
where the second equality uses the fact that winning with a "bid" of Xj requires b*(Xj)
<b*(Cj) for all ] 9^ \; or x•^< Cj for all j 7^ i. Differentiating n(*) with respect to Xj,
evaluating at Xj = c•^, and setting the result to zero yields
P'(Ci) =- (N - 1) Cj [1 - F(Ci)r2 f(Ci). (10)
This differential equation must hold for all Cj less than or equal to the maximal cost
associated with non-negative expected bidder profit. This cost level, denoted c, is
implicitly defined by
n(c,c) =P(c) - c [1 - F(c)]^"'' = 0. (11)
To solve the differential equation subject to the boundary condition, integrate both
sides of (10) over the interval c, G [c,c] and substitute for P(c) from (11) to get an
expression for the equilibrium expected payment to a bidder w^ith supply cost c:
P(c) =c[1 - F(c)f-'' + f '^ [1 - F(x)f-''dx for c £ 3. (12)
The maximal supply cost consistent with non-negative expected bidder profit is
simply b, the announced reservation price. Given b, the auctioneer's expected
payment to an individual bidderwith random supply cost is
p(b) = [ '^'P(c)f(c)dc.
Substitution from (12) and integration by parts yields^
p(b) = f^^(cf(c) +F(c))[l - F(c)f-''dc
Tlie auctioneer's expected total cost of procurement of the good or service is simply
Ntimes the expected payment to a representative bidder plus the self-supply cost
weighted by the probability that no qualifying bids are submitted;
T(b) =Np(b) +Cq [1 - F(b)]'^ (13)
To find.the optimal reservation price, minimize T(b) with respect to b. The solution,
denoted b"^, is implicitly defined by®
bt =Co - F(b+) / f(bt). (14)
For the particular case of a U[0,1] distribution of supply costs, F(b) = b, and
f(b) = 1. Making these substitutions in (14) and solving yields b^ = the optimal
reservation price is independent of N. Thus the entries in the top half of Carey's
Table II are wrong. Each entry should simply be one half of the value for self-supply
cost that heads the corresponding column. The expected costs to the auctioneer
associated with choosing the reservation price to be Cq or to be the optimal value,
Co/2, are found by substitution into equation (13);
T(Co) =
N + 1
T(Co/2) =
N + 1
1 - (1 - - Co(1 - C(,)N, (15)
1 - (1 - Co/2)^^^J. (16)
The correct entries for the lower halves of Carey's Tables Iand II are generated by
formulas (15) and (16), respectively. Corrected versions are presented as Tables I
8and II here.®
As Carey claimed, announcing a reservation price equal to self-supply cost is
always inferior, from the auctioneer's perspective, to keeping the reservation price
secret: The entries in my Table I are all larger than the corresponding entries in the
top half of Carey's Table I. Also as Carey claimed, the choice between the strategies
of a secret reservation price and an optimal announced reservation price depends on
parameter values. Carey found that the secret reservation price is always superior
for sufficiently few bidders and the optimal announced reservation price is always
superior for sufficiently many bidders. I find that the optimal announced reservation
price is preferred for a mid-range of bidder numbers when Cq is in the neighborhood
of 0.5 or 0.6,. and the secret reservation price strategy is preferred in all other cases/
One additional comment deserves mention. Both Carey's original analysis of
the auctioneer's choice of auction mechanism and my "correction" of it are flawed in
that they assume limited rationality on the part of bidders. In particular, they do not
credit bidders with the ability to draw appropriate inferences from the auctioneer's
choice ofauction design. If the auctioneer elects to keep the reservation price secret,
for example, bidders should use this information to update their priors on the
auctioneer's self-supply cost because they know that a secret reservation price would
not be rational for certain values ofCq in the [0,1] interval. But this updating of priors
is not reflected ih the derivation of bid strategy (8) nor in the calculation of the
numbers in the top half of Carey's Table I. This feature of the problem warrants
further study.
Notes
''in this analysis, Iadopt an assumption that McAfee and iVIcMillan Identify as a
common feature of conventional auction theories: The auctioneer has the ability to
commit to an announced set of procedures. In the no-reservation-price auction
model, for example, I rule out the possibility that the auctioneer, upon receiving bids,
might renege and reject the low bid.
^The assumption of strict monotonlclty of b*(-) is later validated by the result in
equation (5).
^Actually, it is not clear that a boundary condition of b*(1) =1 is appropriate for
this model. Because bidders would never bid below cost, it makes sense to require
b*(1) > 1. Bids in excess of the maximal value for the seller's supply cost cannot be
ruled out, however, if the seller has credibly renounced the self-supply option. At
least it can be said that Carey's solution is th^ unique equilibrium for an auction
subject to an announced reservation price of b = 1.
^This result is a counterpart to Riley and Samuelson's Proposition 1. An
alternative route to the expression for the optimal bid strategy begins with the
observation that
P(c) = b*(c) [1 -
Substituting from (12) and solving yields
b'(c) = c +
' b
c
1 - F(x)]N-^dx
[1 - F(c)]N-1
for c < b
This is a counterpart to Riley and Samuelson's Proposition 2. With F(x) = x, as is
appropriate for the U[0,1] distribution, the above equation reduces to equation (9).
®This is a counterpart to Riley and Samuelson's Proposition 3which should
read
V, = Vq 1 - F(v Jl/F'(v J
For large values of Nand/or Cq, the Tables report "equal" pairs of entries in
many cases. This appearance is due to rounding error; the optimal reservation price
always yields a strict global minimum of expected buyer cost.
10
^Entries in my Table II are less than the corresponding entries in the top half
ofCarey's Table 1for Cq = 0.5 with N= 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9; and for Cq = 0.6with N= 4
and 5. In all other cases, my Table II entries exceed their'counterparts in the top half
of Carey's Table I. Asimilar pattern emerges for Cq values between 0 and 0.5. For
example, when Cq = 0.3, the optimal reservation price is superior to the unannounced
reservation price for N= 7, 8, 9, 10, and 20, while the unannounced reservation price
is preferred for the other values of N in the Table.
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Table I
T(Co), Expected Buyer Cost with Announced Reservation
Price Equal to Self-Supply Cost
Cq 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
N
• 2 0.458 0.528 0.586 0.629 0.657 ' - 0.667
% 3 0.406 0.449 0.477 0.493 0.499 0.500
4 0.356 0.381 0.393. 0.399 0.400 0.400
5 0.312 0.326 0.331 0.333 0.333 0.333
6 0.276 0.283 0.285 0.286 0.286 0.286
7 0.245 0.249 0.250 0.250 .0250 0.250
8 0.220 0.222 0.222 0.222 0.222 0.222
9 0.199 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
10 0.181 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182
20 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095
50 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039
M
»
Table II
T(Co/2), Expected Buyer Cost with Announced Reservation
Price Set at Optimal Level
Co 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1:0
N
2 0.385 0.438 0.484 0.523 0.556 0.583
3 0.342 0.380 0.411 0.435 0.454 0.469
4 0.305 0.333 0.354 0.369 0.380 0.387
5 0.274 0.294 0.308 0.318 0.324 0.328
6 0.248 0.262 0.272 0.278 0.281 0.283
7 0.225 0.236 0.242 0.246 0.248 0.249
8 0.206 0.213 0.218 0.220 0.221 0.222
9 0.189 0.194 0.-197 0.199 0.199 0.200
10 0.174 0.178 0.180 0.181 0.182 0.182
20 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095
50 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039
